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Voting power methodology oﬀers insights to understand coalition building in
collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power
inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by cap-
turing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity
index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as
determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance
structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by
bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several
important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be
useful for other applications in international politics.
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1 Introduction
Collective decision making is an everyday phenomenon. In some situations formal voting
procedures exist, in other situations decisions are made by consensus. Majority thresholds
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1are most often simple majorities, but higher thresholds can exist for far-reaching decisions.
Sometimes, the votes of individuals are weighted, in other contexts one person carries
one vote. Despite many diﬀerences in setup, most of these situations have one element
in common, namely that a single person, group, party or constituency alone does not
hold a majority; hence, coalitions are necessary to reach the required majority and take
decisions.
Political economy theory, through cooperative game analysis, oﬀers insights to un-
derstand coalition building. A ﬁrst insight is that the notional size of a constituency
(individual, country or group) can diﬀer from its eﬀective weight in the decision process.
Theory therefore distinguishes the former, also called voting share, and the latter, also
called voting power. Voting power can be larger or smaller than the notional voting
share, and the diﬀerence depends on how important a single constituency is in the overall
context of coalition building. This insight into voting power is well-known in the context
of domestic politics. Suppose for example that there are three parties, Red, Rose and
Green, in a Parliament of 100 seats, with the ﬁrst two having 49 seats, and the Green
party having 2 seats. If a majority of 51% is needed, each party needs a coalition with
one of the other parties to win the vote. All the parties are therefore equally critical
in terms of their capacity to build a majority coalition, having the same voting power
of 33.3%. For the larger parties, voting power is lower than their notional weights and
the contrary holds true for the smallest party. A second insight from coalition theory is
that voting power depends also on the structure of the decision-making body, i.e. the
number of constituencies, the distribution of votes and the majority threshold. Again, in
the example of a national Parliament, suppose the Rose and Green parties form a new
party. This new party would have a majority of 51% and therefore a voting power of
100% as no other party would be needed for a majority. Hence, the new party’s voting
power exceeds that of its constituting members, and the voting power of Red would be
zero.
The usefulness of formalised voting power indices has been broadly recognized. The
most widely used indices so far were developed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf
(1965). Following these seminal works, an important number of scholars have developed a
battery of indices to account for stability of the coalitions by taking into account diﬀerent
measures of the size of voters and coalitions (e.g. Johnston, 1978; Deegan and Packel,
1978; and Colomer and Martinez, 1995). Others have focused on deﬁning voting power
taking into account ex ante or a priori connections between voters as a determinant
of coalition building (e.g. between others Myerson, 1977; Shenoy, 1982; Owen, 1982;
Edelman, 1997; Calvo and Lasaga, 1997; Bilbao, 2000; and Perlinger, 2000). None
of these indices, however, account for the proximity between voters within the game
structure. Indeed, it might well be the case that some voters are not able to frequently
build winning coalition together. For example, a voter i might coalesce more often with
voter j than with voter k; and this may not depend only on the relative importance of
voter j compared to the one of k but also on the number of winning coalitions voter i
and j share together compared to the ones voter i shares with voter k. In this paper, we
develop this idea, building on the Banzhaf (1965) index, proposing a new voting power
index accounting for proximity as the frequency voters are able to form coalitions together
should be taken into account while computing voting power.
Furthermore, we introduce linkages between voters in the proximity index as a relative
2determinant of coalition building. Although the measure of linkages in itself is an a priori
one, i.e. we do not model linkages per se, our contribution is to introduce linkages at the
coalition level while it has been until now introduced at the individual level of agents.
Indeed, we argue that coalition building does not depend only on the linkages between
two voters but rather between all coalition participants, and this is taken into account
via our proximity index.
Finally, we present an application to international politics on the governance structure
of the International Monetary Fund (the Fund or the IMF). The Fund has become over
time the most prominent institution for global governance. As such, its representation
and governance structures are increasingly called into question, and countries’ quotas are
therefore central in the discussions. Consequently, we apply our proximity index to the
constituencies represented at the Fund’s Executive Board, its decision making body. The
results of our computations highlight that proximity between voters matters since they
do not build coalitions equiprobably with other voters. Indeed, some voters appear more
often together in winning coalitions than others. For example, we found that Japan’s
voting power rely mainly on the fact that it is an important coalescer for the USA but
not for other constituencies. In this exercise, we also argue that bilateral volumes of
trade is a good indicator reﬂecting the importance of country relationships in building
coalitions. We therefore also compute our proximity index introducing this notion of
linkages. Our results are able to explain several important features of IMF Executive
Board functioning. For example we are able to diﬀerentiate between Brazil and Iran,
the latter getting less voting power than the former, although they have similar voting
shares.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce voting
power methodology, our proximity index and develop its properties. We also introduce
linkages between voters in our proximity set-up. In section 3, we provide an application of
our proximity index to the IMF and present also the results of the computation accounting
for linkages among constituencies in the IMF, the latter being proxied by the bilateral
volumes of trade. Section 4 concludes.
2 An index of proximity
2.1 Voting power methodology
Voting power methodology is a valuable tool for policy analysis because it captures nu-
merically the distribution of power in collective decision-making processes. Its usefulness
is twofold: ﬁrst, it reveals the distribution of eﬀective power between voters, which can be
quite diﬀerent from the notional distribution of voting shares and which is more relevant
in understanding the eﬀective decision-making. In this respect, by comparing notional
shares with eﬀective powers, voting power indices allow to evaluate the fairness of voting
rules and provide positive as well as normative tools in understanding the practices and
outcomes by voting bodies. Second, voting power analysis can quantify the impact of
changes in voting procedures on the voting power of individual or groups of voters. This
allows assessing the implications of procedural or institutional changes on the overall vot-
ing body. Voting power methodology was particularly prominent in international politics
in assessing the consequences on the EU’s and ECB’s internal voting rules as a result of
3the enlargement rounds (see among others Kirman et al., 1995; Lane and Maeland, 1995;
Bindseil and Hantke, 1997; König and Bräuninger, 1997; Laruelle and Widgrén, 1997;
Holler and Widgrén, 1997; Steunenberg et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2000 and Leech,
2001).
Formally a voting body can be represented as a set N, which contains the n voters
in the voting body, with N = f1;2;:::;ng representing the set of voters. Let the set
W include all winning subsets of N. Three reasonable restrictions are made (Straﬃn
1978): ﬁrst, elements of W must contain one voter, i.e. the empty set of members cannot
ensure acceptance. Second, the entire set of voters N ensure acceptance. Third, if S
and T are subsets of N, with S 2 W and S  T then T 2 W. This implies that if
S can ensure acceptance and T contains all the members of S, then T can also ensure
acceptance. Hence the total number of possible subsets is 2n. If these three conditions
are satisﬁed, a simple game in characteristic function form is then deﬁned as a pair (N,v)
s.t. S : v(S) = 1 if S is winning and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
In many voting bodies, voters may have weights, represented by their voting shares.
The voting weights for N with a speciﬁed vote threshold q are denoted as [q;w1;w2;:::;wn].
Therefore, v(S) = 1 iﬀ [S 2 W ,
P
i2S wi  q], otherwise v(S) = 0. A voter i is said to
be critical when she has a negative swing in a coalition S if v(S) = 1, but v(S n i) = 0.1
In other words, if voter i withdraws her support, she can turn a winning coalition into a
losing one.
The most widely used index is the so-called normalized Banzhaf index (1965) that
calculates the share of a critical voter’s negative swings in the overall number of negative
swings. Hence, it measures how important a given voter is among the group of critical
voters that can all bring down winning coalitions. For any player i 2 N, the normalized
Banzhaf index, denoted 
B










SN[v(S)   v(S n j)]
(1)
Following Banzhaf, scholars developed indices that, at least indirectly, try to account
for the stability of coalitions. There are three main proposals in the literature that we
present brieﬂy to put our work in context: Johnston (1978) for example, reﬁned the
Banzhaf calculation method to account for the overall number of critical voters in the
winning coalitions. Speciﬁcally, he aimed at capturing the fact that in a coalition with
only one critical voter, the latter is more powerful than in a coalition where there are more
critical voters, because the threat of one to withdraw reduces the power of the others.
Deegan and Packel (1978) proposed an index to capture another element associated with
the costs of maintaining a coalition arguing that the larger a coalition in terms of the
number of members, the more vulnerable it is because it is generally more subject to the
withdrawal of members. Finally, the index developed by Colomer and Martinez (1995)
captures the fact that coalitions are more stable with small critical voters than with larger
ones, for any given number of voters. Overall, these indices put diﬀerent weights to the
critical voter’s worth accounting for the size of coalitions or the characteristics of other
voters sharing the coalition. In our spirit, the size of coalitions is indeed an important
1In order to avoid heavy notations, we will omit braces to write a singleton coalition, writing e.g. Sni
for the coalition S deprived of the player i.
4determinant of voting power, yet we go further in that direction at the agent level by
accounting for bilateral proximity between voters. We develop hereafter our proximity
index.
2.2 Deﬁnition of the index of proximity
Our approach aims at providing an index that captures the frequency voters may be able
to form coalitions according to the characteristics of the game. Classical voting power
indices are capturing individual measures of power and provide no information on the
frequency voters are able to coalesce given the structure of the vote, i.e. their voting
shares, the size of the voting body and the majority threshold. Therefore, we propose a
new measure of voting power: the numerical proximity, that captures how often individual








[v(S)   v(S n i)]; for all players i;j 2 N: (2)
Note that 
P
ii = 0. Actually, 
P
ij represents the times i is critical among coalitions
containing player j. We then have to sum these bilateral scores w.r.t. j to get the
normalized version of the index, in the spirit of Banzhaf2. For any player i 2 N, the















The proximity index provides therefore an indication of proximity between voters
deﬁned as the frequency they may build a winning coalition together, when one of them
is critical. As a simple example, let us use the following simple game [6; 4, 3, 2, 1].











A 0 3 3 2
B 2 0 1 2
C 2 1 0 2
D 0 1 1 0
Interestingly, we can see from the computation of (2) that voter B builds more fre-
quently wining coalitions with voter D than with voter C although wC > wD . Moreover,
voter A does not participate in coalitions when voter D is critical, and therefore we can
conclude that voter D is closer, in terms of proximity, with voters B and C than with
voter A. We then normalize (2) to obtain (3) and compare the results to other indices
(see Table 1). Columns one and two give the name of players and their respective voting
shares. Column three gives the number of swings for each voter. Column four presents
2Hausken and Mohr (2001) derives a matrix value in the same spirit from the Shapley value and apply
it to the European Council of Ministers between 1981 and 1995.
5our proximity index and the rest of the columns exposes the outcomes of computing
Banzhaf indices. This little example provides a clear representation of the importance of
taking into account proximity between players when estmating voting power. We develop
more formal properties of (3) in the following sub-section.
Table 1: A simple example computing the normalized proximity index.
Voter Weight Swings Proximity Norm. Banzhaf Abs. Banzhaf
A 4 5 0.400 0.417 0.625
B 3 3 0.250 0.250 0.375
C 2 3 0.250 0.250 0.375
D 1 1 0.100 0.833 0.125
2.3 Properties of the normalized proximity index
A ﬁrst observation that one can make about this index is that 
P
i can be written in terms
of marginal contributions of player i in the game, as well as other well-known indices
(Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Deegan-Packel, Johnston, Colomer-Martinez, etc.). In other








S[v(S)   v(S n i)];
where the i





kj is a constant that only depends on the game v. In particular, whenever a
power index 
 can be written in terms of marginal contributions of the voters, 
 satisﬁes
the following property (Weber, 1988):
Player i 2 N is said to be null for v if for any coalition S, v(S) = v(S n i), i.e., she is
never critical.
Nullity axiom: for any game (N;v) and any i 2 N null for v, 
i = 0.
Note that according to the philosophy of the proximity index, the larger is the coalition
S containing i, the bigger is the coeﬃcient i
S. In particular, 
P
i does not depend on the
marginal contribution of i when she is the only player of the coalition, i.e., i
i = 0. More
accurately, the above coeﬃcients i












Indeed, let S  N such that S 3 i. Thus the diﬀerence [v(S)   v(S n i)] appears once in
the bilateral score 
P
ij, for every j 2 S n i.
A consequence of this is that the proximity index satisﬁes the symmetry property, that
is to say, does not depend on the labelling of the players. Indeed, the pi
S’s do not depend
on i.
Last but not least, it is noteworthy that the proximity index satisﬁes the monotonicity
postulate, which is a very reasonable property that power indices should satisfy (Felsenthal
and Machover, 1995).
6The monotonicity postulate: Let (N;v) be a weighted-voting game [q;w1;:::;wn].
A power index 
 satiﬁes the monotonicity postulate if for all players i;j 2 N,
wi  wj implies 
i(v)  
j(v).
However, it appears that not all power indices satisfy this very natural property. In
particuler, the Deegan-Packel and the Colomer-Martinez do not satisfy it.
Proposition 1 The proximity index satiﬁes the monotonicity postulate.
Proof: Let i and j be two players such that wi  wj. Consider any coalition S in which
i is decisive. If player j belongs to S, she/he is also clearly critical in S. Otherwise,
j is critical in (S n i) [ j. Therefore, this describes an injection  between the set Wi
of coalitions in which i is critical, and the set Wj of coalitions in which j is critical:
 : S 7!
(
S if S 3 j
(S n i) [ j else
: Thus, jWij  jWjj. Moreover,  preserves the cardinality.
Consequently,
P
S2Wi(jSj   1) 
P





7Table 2: Comparison of classical voting power indices and the proximity index3
Index Admissible coalitions Worth of voter i in S Dimension of power
Banzhaf Min. winning 1 Normalized (individual)
Johnston Min. winning 1=p, p: number of Normalized (individual)
critical voters in S
Deegan-Packel Stricly Min. winning 1=q, q: number of Normalized (individual)
voters in S
Colomer-Martinez Stricly Min. winning wi: weight of Normalized (individual)
voter i in S
Proximity (2) Min. winning Number of times j appears Bilateral between
in coalition when i is critical voters i and j
Proximity (3) Min. winning Number of voters sharing Normalized (individual)
coalitions when i is critical
2.4 Introducing linkages in the proximity index
Another path of research has developed indices introducing preferences or ideologies of
voters in the building of coalitions, the so-called preference-based indices. Researchers
start by laying out a priori the political space that either pre-connects certain voters
in a deterministic fashion or assigns ex ante probabilities to diﬀerent coalitions. This
then helps to exclude certain combinations or to the contrary makes ’outlier coalitions’
more likely. In this strand of research, the approaches of Owen (1977 and 1982), Myerson
(1977) and Bilbao (2000) consist for example of taking into account pre-existing coalitions’
structures between similar voters. Shenoy (1982) follows this line of research introducing
ideology in a Banzhaf index using geometry to deﬁne political space of voters. Stenlund
et al. (1985) provided an extension of the power index approach to take into account how
actors behave in order to restrict the coalition possibilities. In a ﬁrst step, they examine
the power in the Swedish Riksdag considering more than 5000 decisions made during the
period covering the shifts in government in 1976 and 1978. In the second step, they use the
obtained relative frequencies of historical decisions to proxy the probabilities of the various
parties to be a member of a (winning) coalition. Perlinger (2000) extends Edelman’s
(1997) model and put diﬀerent weights on the allowable coalitions. The underlying idea
is that the possibility of coalition building is given by aligning coalition on an ideological
spectrum. Along the same lines, Calvo and Lasaga (1997) and Calvo, Lasaga and van
den Nouweland (1999) use probabilistic graphs to deﬁne coalition building in the Spanish
Parliament using probabilities deﬁned by a survey. Finally, Aleskerov (2006) deﬁnes
preferences to go together in a coalition as a linear order and thus is able to rank preferred
coalitions.
Generally, researchers have modelled preferences as probabilities of forming coalition
between two voters/parties. However, none of them deal with the fact that preferences
or ideologies depend also on the composition of other voters sharing the coalitions and
that some voters may appear together in coalitions more often than others, i.e. taking
into account proximity between voters. Yet, the very notion of coalition implies the
3A strictly minimal winning coalition is a coalition containing only critical voters (see for example
Lees and Taylor, 2006).
8principle of commonly shared interests. Gupta (2003) argues that the purpose of these
shared interests is to create a certain degree of linkages, which do not necessarily involve
a formal commitment or a commonality of purposes among members of the coalition. In
other words, linkages between voters may vary over time, across members and importantly
across outcomes. One should thus model linkages at the coalition level rather than at
the agent level. In this respect, our proximity index already provides the ﬁrst step, by
identifying voters sharing coalitions together. Consequently, we introduce, on top of the
proximity concept, a measure of linkages between voters accounting for other voters in
the coalition.
As we discussed above, modelling linkages between voters is subjective. Taking this
as given, our proxy of linkage between voters is exogenous, i.e. the intensity of linkages
between voters is not per se modelled. Nonetheless, what is modelled is the introduction
of a measure of linkages that is relative to each coalition and each voter. More precisely,
while the measure of linkages in itself may be deﬁned by very diﬀerent proxies, in our
application we used bilateral volumes of trade as a proxy of coalition building deter-
minants in International Financial Institution, our contribution is to introduce linkage
at the coalition level accounting for proximity between voters. For example, two voters
might have strong linkages to build coalitions together but might not appear often in
coalitions together. It might also be the case that some voters appear often in coalitions
together but do not share strong linkages. Moreover, coalition building does not depend
only on the linkages between two voters but rather on linkages shared among all coalition
participants. In a proximity framework, this is modelled as the relative linkages shared
by all members of the coalition with the critical voter. More formally, suppose that a
jNjjNj matrix M is given, representing linkages between players. For example, N may
be a set of countries, and for any i;j 2 N, M may represent the worth of trade between
them: Mij can be the worth of all goods imported by country i from country j.4
On the same principle as the construction of the proximity index, we introduce a
















, is the bilateral normalized relative notion of linkages between
voters.
















We provide a formal example of this notion in the annex and in the following section
where we present an application of our proximity index.
4We suppose that for all players i 2 N, Mii = 0.
93 Application of the proximity index to the IMF Ex-
ecutive Board
IMF quotas are an important issue in IMF governance because they constitute the build-
ing blocks for many aspects of the IMF and its operations. A country’s quota directly
translates into voting rights because the number of votes a country has in the Fund is
based primarily on the size of its quota. In addition, a member’s quota ﬁxes how much
that country may be called upon to lend to other members through the Fund. Finally, it
also determines how much a member can borrow from the Fund. These roles indisputably
imply that proximity and linkages between voters are strategic elements when it comes
to voting since the action of voting in the IMF includes the notion of an agreement to
politically and/or ﬁnancially support another member country.
The representation and governance structures of the Fund are increasingly called into
question. Among members, pressure for change is growing. Emerging market and devel-
oping countries consider that their "under-representation undermines the legitimacy" of
the IMF (G24, 2005). In his report for the 2005 Annual Meetings, IMF Managing Director
de Rato argued that "governance imbalances in the Fund now rival current account im-
balances", adding that "neither imbalance is sustainable" (IMF, 2006). Similar concerns
are expressed in academic circles, as captured by Ted Truman, who argues that "issues of
governance are substantively crucial if the IMF is to regain the trust and respect of all of
its member nations" (Truman, 2005). The purpose of this section is therefore to provide
on top of a simulation exercise of our proximity index, a new view of the representation
at the Fund given proximity between voters and given their relative linkages.
Few scholars have used voting power to study IMF’s governance issues. Between
others, Leech (2002), Leech and Leech (2005), Alonso-Meijide and Bowles (2005) and
Bini Smaghi (2006) found that the voting structure of the IMF EB gives disproportionate
power to the United States at the expense of all other members. This means that for
the United States, eﬀective voting power exceeds their notional voting share, whereas for
all other 23 constituencies the opposite result holds. Overall, these studies provide an
intresting view of the relative voting power of constituencies but they do not inform us
on the frequency constituencies are bound to build coalition together.
We start therefore our exercise by computing (2) using the voting structure of the IMF
Executive Board. Note that all simulations are based on a simple majority threshold.
Chart 1 plots for each constituency the diﬀerence of their proximity score to the mean
of the proximity scores for all constituencies sharing a winning coalition with the critical
voter. More precisely, critical constituencies are listed on the x axis while voters sharing
coalitions with the latter are listed on the y axis. The diﬀerence to the mean is on the
z axis in percentage points. Quite clearly, the domination of the American constituency
is signiﬁcant as the number of constituencies sharing winning coalitions with them are
signiﬁcantly higher than other critical voters. Moreover, proximity appears very obvious
since some voters appear more often (than the average voter, in this representation) in
coalitions with others. For example, Japan (JPN) share a more important number of
coalitions with the American constituency than with the Rwandan and the Indian ones.
Another good example is the case of the Swiss constituency that appears in rather large
number of coalitions when the Dutch constituency is critical.
To put these results in perspective, we propose a ranking analysis of (2) in Table
103. For each critical constituency, we have ranked the other constituencies by decreasing
order of appearance. The table should be read as follows taking the example of the
USA being critical on the second column: Japan is the constituency with which the
USA are sharing the most important number of winning coalitions, followed by Germany,
Belgium, etc. It is therefore now possible to clearly show how proximity matters. It is also
apparent from this ranking analysis that the USA are always ranked ﬁrst in the proximity
index, reinforcing thus their importance in the process of coalition building. However the
original ranking (see ﬁrst column of Table 4), i.e. the distribution of voting shares, is not
respected for other constituencies. Quite noticeably, the case of Japan is interesting (JPN
is in bold in Table 3). While the country’s constituency is ranked second with 6.02% of
voting shares, it is never ranked second using our proximity index. At best, Japan is
ranked third when Peru’s constituency is critical. At worst, it is four times ranked 20th.
This shows that given its size, the distribution of voting shares, the number of voters
and the majority threshold, Japan appears relatively less often in coalitions when other
members are critical although it is ranked second in terms of voting share. In the case
of Japan, we can argue that part of its voting power is therefore due to the fact that
it appears more often than others in coalition when the USA are critical, since it does
not appear to coalesce signiﬁcanly with other players. Proximity appears therefore as an
important determinant of coalition building in the sense that some voters are restricted
to build coalitions together more or less often depending on their relative size.
Chart 1: Computation of the proximity index for the IMF Executive Board
11Table 3: Ranking analysis of the proximity index computation
We now introduce linkage in our proximity index. For this illustration, we choose
to compute (3), i.e. the normalized index (see table 4 below), using bilateral volumes of
trade as a proxy for linkages between voters (see annex for a discussion of this issue). The
domination of the USA is increased compared to the normalized Banzhaf index. Indeed,
the USA appear in a large number of winning coalitions including large players with which
they share relatively important linkages. Interestingly, some constituencies are emerging,
in the sense that they gain in ranking compared with their voting share ranking: the
Canadian, the Venezuelan and the Brazilian ones. Introducing linkage permits therefore
to identify the fact that these constituencies are more likely to enter coalition building
12with the USA than others because they share relatively larger linkages with the latter as
shown in the annex. Not surprisingly, since the USA are the most important members
in the IMF EB, introducing linkages in the proximity index permits to capture the fact
that countries are closely related to the USA, i.e. that trade much with them, gain from
the fact that the USA is the largest member in the voting body. Indeed, since Venezuela,
Canada trade much with the USA, both have a stronger will to share a coalition with
the USA and the inverse is true since the USA trade much with these countries. Another
interesting case is the one of the Great Britain (GBR) and France (FRA). Indeed, these
two countries have exactly the same voting share of 4.86% in the IMF inducing that
they have the same voting power. Still, the historical political position of the GBR is
oriented towards a quasi-unconditional support to the USA. Our results explain GBR’s
strategy since their power is larger than the one of France, respectively 4.0% and 3.65%
in normalized terms as shown in Table 4 below. The same applies also for Iran and
Brazil. Indeed, both have the same voting share of 2.42% and the same Banzhaf index of
2.3%. However, Brazil is much closer to the USA, politically speaking which is translated
also in larger trade volumes between the two countries. As a result, the voting power
of Brazil is 2.67% whereas Iran gets 1.96%. Introducing linkages in the proximity index
appears therefore as usefull tool since it permits to capture other determinants of coalition
building. Quite clearly, while the proximity index shows the importance of proximity in
coalition building, linkage permits to introduce another dimension in coalition building
which reﬂect some intresting features of international politics in the particular case of the
International Monetary Fund.
13Table 4: Voting shares, Banzhaf and proximity with linkage indices and ranking
analysis in the IMF Executive Board
Rank Voting share Country Norm. Banzhaf Norm. proximity Ranking of proximity
with linkage with linkage
1 16.80 USA 20.93 25.56 USA
2 6.02 JPN 5.73 5.86 CAN
3 5.88 DEU 5.60 4.78 JPN
4 5.15 BEL 4.90 4.22 VEN
5 4.86 FRA 4.62 3.64 DEU
6 4.86 GBR 4.62 4.00 BEL
7 4.76 NLD 4.53 3.75 GBR
8 4.45 VEN 4.23 5.23 NLD
9 4.11 ITA 3.90 3.58 FRA
10 3.85 AUS 3.66 2.95 ITA
11 3.66 CHN 3.47 2.97 FIN
12 3.64 CAN 3.45 5.87 CHN
13 3.44 FIN 3.26 3.10 AUS
14 3.20 EGY 3.04 2.56 BRA
15 3.17 SAU 3.01 2.41 IDN
16 3.12 IDN 2.96 2.57 EGY
17 2.94 KEN 2.79 2.49 KEN
18 2.79 CHE 2.64 2.38 SAU
19 2.70 RUS 2.56 2.16 CHE
20 2.42 BRA 2.29 2.67 RUS
21 2.42 IRN 2.29 1.95 IRN
22 2.35 IND 2.23 1.92 IND
23 1.96 PER 1.85 1.82 PER
24 1.39 RWA 1.31 1.44 RWA
4 Conclusion
We have presented a new framework to capture the numerical proximity of voters in coali-
tion building. While standard voting power indices, such as the Banzhaf index, capture
the relative importance of critical voters, our index provides bilateral representation of
power as the frequency voters may build coalition together according to the structure of
the game. Indeed, given the distribution of votes, the numbers of voters and the majority
threshold, some voters may appear more often in coalition together than others, given
their characteristics.
We provide a formal deﬁnition of our index of proximity as weel as a normalized
form, in the spirit of Banzhaf. We present also our proximity index introducing linkages
as determinant of coalition building. Although preference-based indices have been quite
criticized for using a priori measure of linkages, we do not overcome this criticism but
provide a diﬀerent way to model linkage at the level of coalition rather than at the agent
level, introducing linkage as a relative measure between all coaltion participants.
14We present a simple example of our proximity index and apply our index to the
countries and constituencies represented at the IMF’s Executive Board. We compute our
proximity index and ﬁnd interesting patterns in coalition building withtin the institution.
We provide a ranking analysis of the frequency voters are building coalitions together.
While former studies found that the USA dominate decision making since they are im-
portant critical voters, our index permits to show that this is also the case due the fact
that they always appear ﬁrst in the ranking analysis when the other contsituencies are
critical. For example, our results exhibit that Japan is an important voter thanks to the
fact that it coalesces more often with the USA than with other constituencies. In other
words, to coalsce more often with frequent critical voters increases your voting power.
In addition, we provide an application of our proximity index introducing linkage
between constituencies. For this application in the context of international economic
cooperation, we use the relative volumes of bilateral trade as an indicator reﬂecting
the importance of constituencies’ relationships. The results are able to explain several
important features of the IMF functioning such as the relative larger voter powers of the
Canadian, the Venezuelan and the Brazilian constituencies.
Looking ahead, we would like to apply our index of proximity to other voting bodies
in international politics. On the practical side, better measuring and conceptualizing
linkages among coalition participants constitutes a challenging but appealing research
agenda.
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18Annex
Determinants of coalition building in the international ﬁnancial institutions
In the special case of international politics, for which the Bretton Woods institutions
are good examples, decisions are involving actions (ﬁnancial or not) on a member or a
group of members. The IMF decides on ﬁnancial assistance to members, on organising
principles of the international monetary system (rules of cooperation, sharing of ﬁnancial
contributions among members, composition of the special drawing rights, etc.) and on
members’ compliance with these principles (for example in the surveillance framework
that can entail decisions on whether countries comply with their obligation to report
data to the Fund and maintain policies that are conducive to overall international sta-
bility). Moreover, the IMF promotes international monetary cooperation more broadly
including through the provision of analysis of international linkages and spillovers, it gives
policy advice to members and it provides technical assistance to help countries build and
maintain strong economies. The World Bank decides on loans and grants for project in
member countries, and it lays the rules for international development assistance.
Therefore, coalition building is likely to be inﬂuenced a priori by economic bilateral
relations between members. Of course, we cannot ignore the general policy content of
IMF and World Bank interventions, and the choice of the proxy to account for economic
bilateral relations between members should therefore capture this element. In this respect,
we believe that bilateral trade between members is a reasonable ﬁrst candidate as a proxy
for a measure of proximity between members of the Executive board of the IMF and the
World Bank. For one thing, one should choose a proxy that captures not only economic,
but also political relations between countries. Indeed, the literature on the determinants
of IMF lending make it clear that voting in the IMF involves strong bargaining when
it comes to ﬁnancially support another member. Thacker (1999), Oatley and Yackee
(2004), Oatley (2002) and Barro and Lee (2005), for example, found evidence that access
to Fund resources is skewed towards countries that are aligned with the US. To estimate
this alignment, Bird and Rowlands (2001) used bilateral trade of the borrowing countries
with the US and France.
As suggested by the geographic literature economic (see Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004 for a survey), bilateral trade is a superior proxy for bilateral relations between
countries because it captures the border eﬀect associated by at least 6 determinants: (1)
the distance barrier (Srivastava and Green, 1986; and Krugman, 1991), (2) the language
barrier (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; and Hummels, 2001), (3) the currency barrier (Rose
and Wincoop, 2001; Rose, 2004, Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor, 2003; and Lopez-
Cordova and Meissner, 2003), (4) the informational barrier (Portes and Rey, 2002; Rauch
and Trindade, 2002; Head and Ries, 1998), (5) the contracting costs and insecurity bar-
rier (Evans, 2001; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) and (6) the non-tariﬀ policy barrier
(Haarigan, 1993; Head and Mayer, 2000; and Chen, 2002). Finally, Rose (2004) has shown
using a gravity model that bilateral trade may also capture historical (i.e. colonial) and
geographic dimensions.
The top panel of Chart A below illustrates this for two interesting countries, the US
and Germany. Indeed, as we can see, bilateral relations can be illustrated by a sort of
’snail’ if we rank members by decreasing intensity of bilateral trade. We note for example
that Germany’s trade is spread more equally across trading partners (with France taking
19the highest share at about 17%), whereas US external trade is more heavily concentrated
(with Canada taking the highest share at 30%). In political terms, we can interpret, these
distributions loosely speaking as exports of country X to country Y capturing ’how much
country X is willing to coalesce with country Y’ and imports of country Y to country
X capturing ’how much country X is willing to coalesce with country Y’. Comparing for
example the top panel of Chart A1 for the US and the bottom one which graph levels of
US exports shares into others Executive Board constituencies, we are able to distinguish
between the linkages of the US and the linkages of others members with the US. For
example, we notice that the US are closer to a number of countries, such as Malaysia
and India to pick two examples, but that only few countries are closer to the US, which
would include Canada or Venezuela.
Chart A: Repartition of export shares to EB members for the US and Germany;
Repartition of US imports share by EB members
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